Coal and steel:

Two raw materials and resources that, for centuries, served as both the catalyst and the rationale for war in Europe.

In 1950, they formed the foundation of one of the most successful peace projects in human history.

The ninth of May is dedicated to this – Europe Day, marking how the Schuman Declaration got the European ball rolling in 1950.

Just under a year later, 75 years ago, Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, Carlo Sforza and their counterparts from the Benelux countries signed the treaty in Paris that established the European Coal and Steel Community – the beginning of a new, united Europe.

Konrad Adenauer immediately recognised this historic opportunity for the young Federal Republic of Germany: a chance to ensure lasting alignment with the West for the free part of Germany, which could thus act as an equal partner in a new Europe.

The economy made Europe great and capable of action. This principle holds true today just as it did back then.

But the era in which coal and steel formed the economic backbone of Europe is over.

Seventy-five years later, materials such as dysprosium, samarium and lithium are the order of the day – key raw materials, rare earths that are essential to our industrial base today.

But they’re not readily available in Europe.

Europe sources 97% of its heavy rare earth needs from China.

Within 25 years, China has increased its share of global industrial production from 6% to 30%. During the same period, the European Union’s share shrunk from 19% to 15%. In 2025, we lost more than 300 industrial jobs in Germany. Every single day! Last year.

China’s trade and industrial policy is distorting global markets to a massive degree.

And this approach is set to intensify. With its new five-year plan, China is spelling out its ambition to become a global economic leader.

But that’s not all.

At the same time, European exports to other markets, particularly to the US, are plummeting. We’re currently not keeping pace with developments in AI and the digital economy. Europe’s capital markets are too small and fragmented to adequately promote technologies of the future.

At the same time, we’re contending with serious security crises as we’re currently facing two wars.

Ukraine is already braving its fifth year of resisting Russia’s illegal war of aggression. We’re continuing to support Ukraine’s battle to defend itself with substantial economic and military resources as it is also defending our freedom at the end of the day. The freedom of Europe.

And since late February, the war in the Gulf has been challenging us politically and economically, and will perhaps also do so militarily in the future. Even though we’re not directly involved, this war is having a direct impact on our European interests. It is a reflection of a world order that is being realigned, that is changing.

This, incidentally, also includes transatlantic relations. The US is now giving much clearer expression to how it pursues and prioritises its interests. At the same time, the Americans continue to view the transatlantic alliance as one that also benefits them, that must benefit them.

We can, indeed we must, shape this change as Europeans. The potential for this is enormous, and the prerequisite for this is clear, namely European unity and solidarity.

After all, only the clout that Europeans bring to the table together – as a Union – enables us to find effective, substantial and impactful responses to the major issues of our time.

We have the resources that we need. Let’s put them to use!

The single market is one of the three largest markets in the world. It can give us the clout to compete on an equal footing with the US and Chinese economies. But we still need to exhaust its full potential.

For example, start-ups founded in Germany or Lithuania must be able to do business in Estonia or Italy without facing legal obstacles. They must receive the financial support they need in Europe in order to conquer the global market.

After all, there are plenty of brilliant ideas in Europe; they just too often end up elsewhere.

The Commission is driving forward an ambitious agenda that will further strengthen the single market. A single market for defence equipment could provide a significant boost to cooperation in planning, development and procurement across Europe. It can accelerate the development and procurement of capabilities that are vital to us, and it can reduce costs.

The groundwork for this has already been laid, of course. We need only think of the omnibus packages, the 90 billion euro loan for Ukraine, the SAFE (Security Action for Europe) initiative for investments in joint procurement and the European Defence Industry Programme, which aims to close critical military capability gaps. No one could have imagined any of this just a few years ago.

In terms of technological dominance, however, the EU has fallen significantly behind the US and China in recent years. It will counteract this through its competitiveness agenda and our considerable potential for innovation. In a nutshell, European patents must translate into European companies.

The aim is to strengthen the EU as a geo-economic actor. We’re doing this as a reliable trading partner that respects the rules-based international order.

This is paying dividends. The trade agreement with our Mercosur partners has been in force since 1 May, and the agreement with India is strategically important for linking our economies more closely together. No other actor has yet been able to achieve the market liberalisation negotiated with India. The agreement with Mexico is scheduled to be signed in a few weeks’ time.

These successes are also thanks to the fact that our trading partners – like us – want to reduce dependencies and make their supply chains more sustainable and resilient. We will seize these opportunities to tap into new markets.

Ladies and gentlemen,

We’re witnessing right now just how important diversification is with respect to the Strait of Hormuz and elsewhere.

Yes, we’re reliable and steadfast. But we must also become more agile, more flexible and more innovative. The European Union must adapt to reality. It must change – fundamentally.

Just as Adenauer and Schumann once sought and found responses to a new world order – with conviction and courage. We want to build on that courage. Because it’s up to us Europeans.

I would like to mention six specific points.

First, we want to achieve more in Brussels through “enhanced cooperation”. This means that in policy areas where joint progress with all 27 member states is unlikely, we will move forward with a smaller group of states.

And we will implement the necessary measures “European-style” within this small group – without everyone having to join in straight away.

Experience has shown that other countries tend to follow suit later on. That would be the ideal scenario.

We want to extend this principle to common foreign and security policy. Unanimity is indeed still required for enhanced cooperation.

My proposal is this: countries that do not want to – or perhaps cannot – be involved will initially be left out, but they will not stand in the way of those who wish to move forward.

A group of countries should also be able to move forward more easily as far as common foreign and security policy is concerned.

It goes without saying that we will continue always to strive to act by consensus among the 27 – because that is indeed one of the EU’s strengths. However, it’s important that we as the EU are also able to move forward pragmatically even when perhaps not all 27 member states are 100% in agreement.

The deadlocks, particularly those of recent months and years, which have held the EU hostage to national or extraneous interests at times, are well known.

We saw this as recently as last week with the release of funds. It only takes a few member states – or even just one – to block everyone else from taking action.

I want to say quite clearly that when it comes to security issues, the principle of unanimity can put us in existential danger. Because this is a matter of life and death! We see this every day in Ukraine.

In its common foreign and security policy, the EU regularly falters due to its outdated architecture. Now, conservatives are often wrongly accused of wanting to stubbornly preserve the old ways. That’s not the case with my foreign policy.

Conservative foreign policy is geared towards the country’s interests. It changes what needs to change in a world in flux in order to protect the achievements of civilisation.

This brings me to my second point: qualified majority voting.

Germany wants to bring about change and make a difference in the EU. Brussels must pick up the pace in order for this to happen, especially with respect to common foreign and security policy.

The most important lever for this is quicker decision-making through qualified majority voting. We will not abandon efforts to achieve consensus, but we will make things significantly easier by eliminating the possibility of deadlocks. Our goal remains the greatest possible unity among all 27 member states. However, the path to that goal does not lie in the lowest common denominator. It lies in the courage to take the first step.

“The Q-Word”, as the High Representative recently described qualified majority voting, has the potential to enable the EU to act where it is as yet at a standstill.

Incidentally, we’re not alone in our desire for change. Under our leadership, 12 member states have already come together to bring about this change.

And we will reach out to all member states, including those that remain sceptical.

Let me be very clear when I say that it’s up to us, the decision-makers in the European Union, to use this rapid decision-making tool. The legal framework is in place; the EU Treaties already have provisions to this end. In the defence sector, we were able to demonstrate that this works with the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). At the time, a group of EU member states took the lead and established a successful instrument for joint action.

We must always ask ourselves this: what is the actual purpose of the principle of unanimity? The principle was once introduced to guarantee the most sensitive core of national sovereignty – foreign and defence policy. But what remains of this national sovereignty if its exercise can be blocked by a single member state? Nothing. It is as naught.

This must also involve a shift in mindset. If, as a member state, I disagree with a proposal, the answer in a community of 27 cannot be “well, I’ll just block it then”.

Rather, the focus must be on actively seeking the most widely acceptable solution in such a case.

Third, a clear foreign policy profile for the EU. We need to be able to make quick decisions with concrete results in Europe.

The President of the Commission, the President of the European Council, the High Representative and the many competent commissioners are doing sterling work right now in this regard.

At the same time, foreign and security policy responsibilities in Brussels must be both clearly delineated and pooled.

The European External Action Service must be closely dovetailed with the Commission to this end. After all, that is where the resources lie that shape foreign policy today – such as trade, development, neighbourhood policy, energy, climate and sanctions enforcement. Interconnected security requires interconnected action.

Are we equal to the task in a European Union that must assert itself in the world in a very different way than we did 10, 15 or 20 years ago? Does anyone seriously believe that?

Our goal is to make Europe’s external action more coherent, more effective and more strategic.

The EU is, after all, not a static entity. Let’s consider the path we’ve trodden in recent years – from the diplomatic wrangling over the Strategic Compass as a joint threat assessment to the tangible coordination of extensive European arms deliveries to Ukraine and the financing of member states’ defence projects. A great deal has happened in the EU. It has demonstrated its capacity for innovation several times over, a quality many claim it does not possess. All of this has taken place in just a few years. Because it had to.

Fourth, the rule of law.

Amidst all efforts to forge ahead, we must also pause and take a look at ourselves, at the state of our Union – at member states who knowingly violate the Union’s values. After all, the rule of law is one of the highest values that we Europeans hold, informing our image around the world.

We therefore want to strengthen the rule of law in concrete terms – within the framework of the negotiations on the next multiannual financial framework, and also by strengthening Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. We’re committed to further developing the conditionality mechanism. EU funds must not go to those who violate our common values.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Fifth, the ability to act means that institutions must continue to be able to function even as the Union grows. And grow it must.

However, a Union with 33, 34, or 35 member states cannot simply continue to operate according to the same approach that was designed for a much smaller group of members.

Should we have 35 Commissioners in the future? I don’t think that’s a good idea.

The Treaties do provide for a better solution, namely a smaller Commission comprising only two thirds of the number of member states.

The same goes for the European Parliament. We can see at the national level the kind of challenges that are posed by an oversized parliament.

We therefore want to adapt the composition of the European Parliament and the number of Commissioners to the needs of an enlarged Union. This requires decisions by the European Council, and is yet another issue that we must address.

We want an enlarged EU at the end of the day. But it must also function effectively as an enlarged Union. And I understand the great frustration caused by protracted accession procedures. On the one hand, we want to integrate new members into a strong alliance. On the other, the candidate countries also need to undergo substantial change. Enlargement is a transformative process.

And this brings me to my sixth point: the enlargement process.

I propose structuring the path to the admission of new member states as a step-by-step process in the future.

One possibility is enhanced gradual integration, moving through preliminary stages towards full membership. Such a mechanism would also make it possible to address the reservations that some member states have regarding early full membership. In the future, accession treaties could also include clauses that stipulate conditions for the disbursement of funds, thereby further strengthening the principle of sincere cooperation.

But I want to make it absolutely clear that enlargement is part and parcel of our credibility. The people of the Western Balkans, for example, were offered the prospect of EU accession decades ago. We owe them results. To deliver on this, we must finally make concrete progress together with reform-minded countries. And it’s evident that enlargement to include Iceland and Norway would also be more than welcome.

With these six proposals, I want to try to make our European Union more resilient and capable of taking action.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The Schuman Declaration reads as follows: “World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.”

In view of the crises of our time and the existential threats that we face, our creative effort can only lie in enhanced cooperation in Europe.

And all of us must be aware that we ourselves are writing the future of our nation, and we’re also doing this in Brussels.

After all, the key to Germany’s future in security, a future in prosperity and a future in freedom, lies in Europe.

As it has for over 75 years.

Where would we be today were it not for the courage of its founding fathers?

This must be both a source of inspiration and a call to duty for us going forward.