The organisers announced that there would be a keynote speech on transatlantic relations at this point between the main course and dessert – a speech focusing on the fundamental issues of the day.

That may sound a little dramatic.

However, I’m from northern Germany and we tend not to be prone to drama.

Rather, we’re regarded as down-to-earth, not easily ruffled and unfazed by bad weather. As you know, there's only the wrong clothing and never bad weather.

Perhaps that’s partly because we’re used to the idea that many things are subject to a natural rhythm, not just ebb and flow, the tide coming in and out. And that it’s worth taking a long-term view of stormy developments as well.

That also applies – and now I really do want to get fundamental – to long-standing relations between countries and societies, as well as to relations between the United States of America and ourselves.

In all my north German sobriety, I’d therefore like to start by saying:

As a German citizen, but also as Foreign Minister, I have a fundamental trust in the sustainability of transatlantic relations.

In stating this, I’m certainly not trying to downplay the fact that since the new US Administration assumed office in January, it’s not just the new style of dealing with each other or with other allies that we’ve found irritating and unsettling.

But that we also see statements and indeed actions relating to a whole range of issues that seem to be directed against the bedrock of our cooperation.

Accusations that freedom of opinion is under threat in the European Union, the doubts expressed about the democratic nature of our European societies, the open campaigning for political parties that we have observed.

We regard these developments, myself included, with great concern and without any naivety.

Nevertheless, I recommend two things:

First of all, we should always remember when we see today’s discussions and differences of opinion that transatlantic relations have grown over an extended period.

A partnership, and we in Germany shouldn’t forget this, in which the United States always stood by our side when it mattered.

Without the United States, Europe and Germany would not have been liberated from the National Socialist reign of terror.

Without the United States, it wouldn’t have been possible to reconstruct post-war West Germany so quickly and successfully, it wouldn’t have been possible to integrate the Federal Republic of Germany into the global economy at such an astonishing pace. Nor would there have been an economic miracle or democratic renewal in our country.

The prosperity we still enjoy in Germany today is also thanks to the friendship, the willingness to reconcile and the strategic foresight of the United States over the past decades.

And this is all the more true for our political freedom and for our country’s unity.

After all, Germany’s reunification was only possible due to the trust and support of our friends and partners in the West and East, above all the United States.

The United States has provided us Germans with reliable support at crucial times, also in the face of doubts and resistance from others. Just think of the reunification process and the concerns, some of them perfectly legitimate, which existed in Paris and London, as well as in other capitals.

We should and indeed never will forget the reliable support we received from the United States.

For me personally, this reliability, these historical ties between our countries and our peoples, form the basis of my fundamental trust in our transatlantic partnership.

However, recent months have also shown us that this future cannot be taken for granted.

That we must actively seek to ensure that our unique bond is preserved.

Because then, I’m certain, we can work together as transatlantic partners to achieve great things.

Nor should we forget, and this is my second fundamental recommendation, that misunderstandings and strong conflicts of interest have always been part and parcel of this partnership in the past.

As early as the mid-80s, shortly after the end of his tenure as US Ambassador to Germany from 1981 to 1985, Arthur Burns stated in The United States and Germany. A Vital Partnership, and I quote:

“Past irritations and differences: there have been many of both during the past forty years.”

And then, over several pages, Burns sets out a whole list of contentious issues between the United States and Germany. And this at a time we might consider the “golden age” of German-American relations!

Many of these controversies have since faded into history and they hardly mean anything to us today.

Others, however, still sound surprisingly relevant today.

For example, there was a discussion about how to share the transatlantic defence burden fairly as early as the 70s and 80s, and it has cropped up again and again since then. As you know, we are currently discussing these issues in the run-up to the NATO summit.

The same goes for trade-related debates, which are once again a major issue at the moment, the order of the global economy or how to deal with strategic rivals and global challenges.

For Burns, who was an economist by trade, the existence of different interests and conflicts of interest between countries as closely linked as Germany and the United States was quite natural.

He thought it was much more important, and I quote him once again:

“that the interests that unite us – social, political, economic and military – are strong enough to overcome even divisive issues” and that we “work together and practise mutual accommodation even when governments and underlying conditions in our two countries keep changing”.

The differences of opinion, irritations and sometimes deep insecurities we’re experiencing now seem to many to be more profound, more fundamental, more dangerous.

Yes, the tone is rougher than it has been for a long time.

And yes, we are experiencing radical changes in the United States itself with an unknown outcome.

But against the background I have just described and in view of the existential importance of good mutual relations for both sides, and it is indeed my firm belief that this goes both ways, we should not be deterred or even start panicking.

Instead, we have to withstand this turbulent phase by first focusing on our own interests.

And by taking action – and doing so in our own vested interests:

by strengthening our defence capability,

protecting our trade interests, and

formulating our understanding of freedom of opinion and academic freedom.

In doing so, we should soberly and calmly acknowledge that these interests and those of our allies must be constantly readjusted, realigned and also explained.

And above all, that they will never become completely congruent and don’t have to be congruent in order for us to remain close allies and partners.

But – and this brings me from the fundamental to the topical and also to the occasion for this evening’s dinner – this requires people who know both sides of the Atlantic from their own very concrete experience.

People who sense when perceptions diverge, when it becomes necessary to remind each other of one's own interests, but also the shared interests that make a partnership sustainable.

This is primarily a task for us as politicians and diplomats. That’s why it was very important to me that I was able to meet my American counterpart Marco Rubio last week on my first official visit to Washington.

It happened to be the day of his birthday and yet he took the time to meet me – which, naturally, I saw as a small mark of appreciation.

But, of course, in addition to my congratulating him, we used this opportunity to discuss pressing current issues:

Continued support for Ukraine in the face of Russia’s war of aggression, most recently last week with the most massive Russian air strikes since the start of the war;

Transatlantic security and defence policy, which is, of course, inextricably linked to the threat to our transatlantic security posed by Russia;

But also trade relations between the European Union and the United States, with both sides clearly committed to reaching a negotiated solution.

We have full confidence that the European Commission can negotiate a substantive and balanced agreement in a constructive manner.

And without going into too much detail here, following the talks with my American counterpart Marco Rubio, I’d like to say:

I’m now confident that we can reach agreements that serve our mutual interests, even on issues that divide us.

By articulating our own interests clearly and confidently as Germans, as Europeans.

This is a language that Washington certainly understands and also appreciates.

Because ultimately, it cannot be in the United States’ interest either

if Russia emerges victorious from its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine,

If NATO, the central pillar of transatlantic security and thus also US security, loses credibility,

If Russia continues to destabilise and threaten Europe,

If China has the last laugh in a transatlantic trade conflict.

When all is said and done, the Administration in Washington knows that.

And yet there’s one mistake we cannot afford to make. Namely, to believe that these positions, these old transatlantic truths, need no further explanation or propagation in the United States just because we think they are obvious.

We must not be complacent and rest on our laurels. Time and again, rather, we must keep on reminding future generations of Americans of the value of our partnership.

And ask our American friends:

With whom can the United States increase the pressure on Russia to enter into serious negotiations to end the war, if not with us Europeans?

With whom, as a reliable and strong ally, does the United States want to tackle the challenge that China will pose to us all in the coming years, probably decades, if not with partners with whom it shares the values of freedom, democracy and self-determination?

And with whom does the United States ultimately want to reach an agreement on trade issues, in the interest of its own population’s prosperity and of safeguarding millions of jobs, if not with its most important trading partner – the European Union?

Above all, we can underpin this value of the transatlantic relationship by making attractive offers, offers that show that we, too, have understood where the United States' expectations are aligned to our own interests.

Therefore, during my visit to Washington, I once again underscored our determination to achieve the target proposed by NATO Secretary General Rutte, namely to spend 5% of our economic output on defence, including investment in key military infrastructure.

Not only because this is a demand, a clear expectation that the United States has of us.

But also because this target is based on a thorough assessment of the concrete needs of the NATO countries to ensure that they are able to defend themselves effectively in future against threats such as those from Russia.

This investment will make Europe more secure.

And, at the same time, reaching this target will ensure a fairer distribution of the burden of defending Europe.

This also applies to the economic sphere.

The EU and Germany are working day after day to increase our competitiveness, to strengthen our economic resilience and to achieve greater diversification through new partnerships.

By focusing on ourselves and investing here too, we’re building confidence in our own economic strength. Among our partners, too.

This will also benefit our partnership with the United States.

And above all, it will help us to increase our freedom, our security and our prosperity in Germany and Europe. At the same time, it will unleash new potential with regard to transatlantic relations.

What often stands in the way of sober consideration and objective discussion of our respective interests is what Arthur Burns once called a certain “mutual ignorance” in German-American relations.

And that’s why he stressed time and again to his staff at the US Embassy in Bonn back then, and I quote:

“the need to respect the boundary line between sheer opinion and true knowledge” and “the importance of eschewing the titillations of gossip, of verifying rumours wherever possible”.

To me, this sounds not only like a job description for diplomats, but also like a call to journalists on both sides of the Atlantic, especially today.

A call to get to the bottom of things, not to be content with the obvious, to see the diversity and complexity of our two societies beyond big politics, the links between our parliaments, countries, federal states, cities, universities, research institutions and so much more. Connections that, in their depth and diversity, give us hope that our transatlantic relations will endure, even through difficult times.

In order to deliver such critical and diverse reporting, you need support and networks for research on the ground. And that’s what the Arthur F. Burns Fellowships have been providing for almost 40 years.

But you also need the freedom to work without political interference, without coercion, without the sanctioning of sometimes uncomfortable questions and investigations.

You should be able to report on political, military or economic interests, but not with these interests.

If access to press conferences is made more difficult for individual media outlets, if journalists are cast as the enemy, then they can no longer carry out their work freely and fully.

That’s also something we point out time and again to our American interlocutors. And we, too, on the other side of the Atlantic, are committed to this.

Because we know how indispensable a free and independent press is for our democracy.

We learned this from our American friends in particular after the victory over National Socialism.

Our American friends, who only a few days after the end of World War II not only allowed the reconstruction of free media in Germany but energetically supported and promoted it.

This, too, will never be forgotten.

Especially in these challenging times, in times of misunderstandings and irritations, let’s all be bridge-builders in the transatlantic relationship.

Bridge-builders who look for explanations, who point out to us how we can tackle “mutual ignorance”.

Bridge-builders like Arthur F. Burns, who, even 40 years ago, never tired of explaining to Germans and Americans that it’s quite natural for even close partners to have different positions from time to time.

For him, it didn’t matter who ultimately “won” or “lost” when it came to such differences of opinion.

Rather, it was about making the effort to really understand each other's interests.

And to find a common path based on this sober reconciliation of interests, in the spirit of the wonderful partnership that has linked the United States and us for so many decades.

I have trust, a fundamental trust, that we can succeed, without naivety and illusions.