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Iran’s nuclear programme
Foreign Minister Wadephul and his British and French counterparts as well as the High Representative of the European Union give a statement after holding talks with the Iranian Foreign Minister in Geneva (20 June 2025) © Photothek Media Lab
Germany campaigns worldwide to prevent nuclear weapons. There are considerable doubts about the exclusively civilian nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Find out here what we are doing to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.
Background and history
For many years, the international community has been concerned about Iran’s nuclear programme. In response, the UN Security Council agreed on restrictions for Iran and imposed sanctions as far back as 2006.
In an attempt to resolve the conflict about Iran’s nuclear programme through negotiations, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, China and Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) in July 2015. Under this agreement, Iran committed to significantly curtailing its nuclear programme. In return, sanctions were to be eased.
In 2018, the United States withdrew from the JCPoA. Since 2019, Iran has gradually discontinued its nuclear obligations under the agreement and increased its uranium enrichment to up to 60 percent. At the same time, Iran has reduced the transparency of its nuclear programme by restricting access for inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
This strengthens the significant doubts that Iran’s nuclear programme serves exclusively peaceful purposes. Some activities cannot be plausibly explained. For example, Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon state in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that has enriched uranium to such a high level.
Triggering of the snapback mechanism
After years of Iran not adhering to its obligations under the JCPoA, Germany, France and the United Kingdom triggered the snapback mechanism under the Agreement in August 2025, leading to the re-entry into force of the earlier UN Security Council resolutions, which entail measures such as a complete ban on uranium enrichment and strict inspections by the IAEA.
Even after the triggering of the snapback mechanism, Germany, France and the United Kingdom continued striving to achieve a diplomatic solution in order to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The crucial prerequisite for this is that Iran itself shows an interest in reaching a negotiated solution.
Iran’s violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
In addition to its violations of what was agreed under the JCPoA, Iran is also in breach of legal obligations arising from the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, which counters the spread of nuclear weapons by obliging non-nuclear-weapon states to renounce nuclear weapons and to place their nuclear installations under international safeguards.
Since June 2025, Iran has not permitted inspections of the proliferation-relevant Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow nuclear facilities and is no longer meeting its reporting obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The unknown location of around 440 kilos of highly enriched uranium is a particular cause of concern. In theory, this uranium, if enriched further, could provide enough material to produce ten nuclear weapons.