"Safe uranium enrichment for all" — article by Federal Foreign Minister Steinmeier in the Handelsblatt newspaper

A commercial plant under the authority of the IAEA could prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons

Fear of a nuclear war no longer pervades people's hearts and minds. But the nuclear threat not only continues to exist, it is growing. More than 30,000 nuclear warheads are still at large in missile silos and depots with varying security standards. And increasing numbers of states are on the way to or even already capable of building nuclear weapons, as Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programmes show.

Disarmament and arms control must therefore be put back at the top of the international agenda. This is the stated goal of the Federal Government and of my policy. We want to inject new momentum into the debate with concrete proposals, for example in connection with the review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The next Review Conference will take place in 2010. But the preparations for this event began last Monday in Vienna. We have a new idea we want to put forward.

Our aim is not only to stop Iran and North Korea from constructing or deploying nuclear weapons. And our aim is not only to encourage the United States and Russia to take serious steps to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The upcoming negotiations also concern the civilian use of nuclear energy. How can we ensure that states do not exploit uranium enrichment to secretly build nuclear weapons?

Uranium enrichment is a classic way of producing nuclear fuel. However, this complicated technology is also the key to nuclear weapons. We therefore have to find ways of allowing every state unrestricted use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without giving them the wherewithal to acquire a nuclear bomb. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has so far not tackled this problem. It prohibits all contracting parties apart from the five established nuclear Powers from producing, possessing or acquiring nuclear weapons, but grants them all the right to conduct research and development and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

In the 2000 nuclear consensus, German politicians and energy sector representatives agreed to use nuclear power only for an interim period. However, we must accept that a number of other states, particularly some of the newly emerging industrialized nations, want to make use of this right. Only a few countries are capable of enriching uranium on an industrial scale. It is understandable that ever more countries want to free themselves from their dependency on supplies of enriched fuel and to enrich uranium themselves. However, this also increases the potential for abuse.

A discussion on nuclear fuel supply guarantees has therefore been going on for some time. They are intended to prevent increasing numbers of countries from enriching uranium themselves. Numerous proposals have been submitted by various countries, groups of states and experts. All pursue the same approach – to counteract proliferation of this risky technology while guaranteeing supply security even in critical situations; to safeguard the "inalienable right" to the peaceful use of nuclear power which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons guarantees, and not to erode market forces by state intervention or subsidies. The Federal Government is intensively involved in discussions on reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has now submitted a proposal to IAEA Director-General El Baradei which complies with all the above-mentioned strict requirements.

What is special about our initiative? The key factor is that it centres around the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna as an independent and neutral UN institution. Our proposal thus fills a gap in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. When it was founded more than 50 years ago, the IAEA was granted the option of building its own plants. Now the Federal Government is proposing that an additional uranium enrichment plant be built, under the IAEA's responsibility and control.

The location of this plant would have to be accepted by all parties, and the host state would cede clearly defined sovereignty rights to the IAEA. This area would be more or less ex-territorial, rather like the UN Headquarters in New York. The IAEA would thus have the responsibility of deciding whether to hand over enriched material based on the criterion of eliminating the risk of abuse. No other body would be more qualified or more competent to judge this.

The IAEA would not be burdened with operating the enrichment plant. An independent, multinational management board or consortium would be responsible for financing and running the plant. We envisage a purely commercial undertaking. There would no doubt be plenty of interest in the project, for enrichment is profitable. As many countries are planning to build additional nuclear power stations, the market for enrichment is likely to continue to grow. States which already have modern enrichment technology could supply equipment for this plant on a commercial basis.

Contrary to other approaches, our proposal would not prohibit anyone from enriching uranium. If a country wanted to develop and perform its own enrichment openly and in accordance with the IAEA, nobody would stop it. But it would have to ask itself whether it would make economic sense. If that were not the case, it would come under suspicion of pursuing other ends.

This kind of independent plant would be an economically viable and politically credible option for all countries. It would safeguard energy supply security for all. At the same time we could prevent the proliferation of a technology which facilitates the construction of nuclear weapons.

• IAEA