Safe uranium enrichment under international supervision
In Germany, the decision to phase out nuclear power has already been made. Other countries, however, plan to construct new nuclear power plants. For this they need secure access to enriched uranium. But as uranium enrichment can also be used to build atomic bombs, the proliferation of this technology must be restricted as much as possible. Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has put forward a solution.
The debate on assuring a safe supply of nuclear fuel has been going on for decades: Nuclear fuel is needed to operate nuclear power plants, and today's reactors rely to a large extent on enriched uranium. The road from natural to enriched uranium (and ultimately to nuclear fuel elements) is very complicated. So far, only few countries have mastered these processes, most of them Western industrialized countries. Particularly problematic is the fact that uranium enrichment facilities also make it possible to build atomic bombs. Whereas nuclear power plants require low-enriched uranium, nuclear weapons require highly enriched uranium.
The field of tension between non-proliferation and peaceful use
Policy makers, therefore, face two challenges. On the one hand, an increasing number of countries want access to a technology that so far only a handful of industrialized countries have mastered. On the other hand, the risk of a proliferation of nuclear weapons must be eliminated as best as possible.
The German proposal to resolve the issue
Federal Foreign Minister Steinmeier took a proactive approach to the debate and proposed a multilaterization of the fuel cycle. In May 2007, the Federal Government submitted its proposal – the Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project (MESP) – to the competent organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
What is Germany proposing?
The IAEA would receive authority over a special territory in which it – and not the country on which the territory is located – would exercise sovereign tasks, in particular nuclear regulatory oversight and export control.
Within this territory, a consortium made up of interested states and private companies (nuclear industry, energy supply companies) could construct and commercially operate a uranium enrichment plant. The plant would operate on the market as an additional supplier of enriched uranium. However, it would not fall under the control of an individual nation-state and would thus not be subject to outside political influence.
The uranium enrichment plant would be supplied by an existing entity already in possession of the relevant technology, and IAEA control would prevent additional risk of proliferation.
The Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project (MESP) proposed by Steinmeier is meant to provide states with secure and cost-effective access to uranium enrichment, thereby encouraging them to refrain from pursuing uranium enrichment on a national level.
Federal Foreign Minister Steinmeier presented his initiative to the wider public in a May 2007 article in the Handelsblatt newspaper.
Strong role for the IAEA
The German proposal to multilateralize the nuclear fuel cycle assigns a key role to the IAEA. Details were provided to IAEA member states in three circular notes and various presentations.
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Germany's aim with the MESP proposal is to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In addition to disarmament, renunciation of nuclear weapons and inspections, it provides for a cooperative approach to the use of nuclear energy. The treaty guarantees the right of states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The treaty itself therefore encompasses the above-mentioned field of tension: non-proliferation and the restriction of technology transfers on the one hand, and the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy on the other. Germany ratified the treaty as far back as 1975.
Working with partners toward the goal
In October 2007, at the invitation of Federal Foreign Minister Steinmeier, experts convened at the Federal Foreign Office for the first-ever international workshop on this topic. At a conference on 17/18 April 2008 at the Federal Foreign Office, Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain demonstrated that cooperation in assuring a safe supply of nuclear fuel is possible and necessary, without risking further proliferation of the relevant sensitive technology.
Preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons - safeguarding energy supply security
Draft agreements
The Federal Foreign Office, together with the Max Planck Institute Heidelberg and other experts, has drawn up two draft agreements necessary for establishing the MESP: a Host State Agreement for the special territory PDF | 164 KB and a multilateral agreement between the IAEA and a group of interested states PDF | 115 KB
Germany itself will not participate in any of these agreements, as it already possesses the relevant technology and has a secure supply of nuclear fuel for the remaining operating life of Germany's nuclear power plants. However, Germany will offer its good offices to assist in the implementation of the project.
The attached diagrams provide an overview of steps relating to the MESP's foundation, structure and operation:
Last updated 25.03.2009
