The conflict surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme
Natanz enrichment plant
(picture-alliance/dpa)
Federal Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle expressed concern over the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) latest report on the Iranian nuclear programme. On 19 February in Berlin, Westerwelle stressed that the international community wanted to continue dialogue with Tehran, but would not put up with stalling tactics any longer. Further sanctions could not be ruled out if Iran maintained its refusal to cooperate.
Iran is keeping the international community in the dark about key aspects of its nuclear programme. There is reason to doubt that it really serves exclusively peaceful purposes. The United Nations Security Council has therefore called upon Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities, allay the international community’s doubts and restore its confidence in the peaceful nature of the country’s nuclear programme.
Together with the United States, Russia, China, France and Britain, Germany has been working for years to find a solution to the nuclear conflict. These countries – also known as E3+3 – have extended offers of negotiations to Iran on several occasions.
Westerwelle: A nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable
On 21 September 2009, Iran informed the IAEA of the existence of a second, to date undeclared uranium enrichment facility situated in a tunnel near the town of Qom. The German Government condemned the Iranian cover up policy and called upon Tehran to fully disclose its nuclear programme without delay.
After 15 months, the E3+3 managed once again to conduct direct talks with Iran on 1 October. During the meeting in Geneva, Iran declared its readiness to grant the IAEA access to its second enrichment facility. Iran also agreed in principle to export low enriched uranium to Russia and France where it was to be further enriched and converted into fuel rods. Thereafter the fuel rods were to be returned to Iran to be used in a research reactor in Tehran for medical purposes. For the international community, such an arrangement would have the advantage that it could guarantee the uranium is not used for military purposes.
At a technical meeting in Vienna (19–21 October 2009), the IAEA presented concrete proposals for such a procedure. The German Government welcomes these proposals and hopes they can be used as a basis for the first confidence-building steps. So far, however, Iran has not shown a willingness to implement the Geneva agreement. That is why on 27 November 2009 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution calling for Iran to immediately stop construction on the enrichment plant in Qom, to cooperate with the international community and to uncover its nuclear programme.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki also failed to use his participation in the Munich Security Conference to address the international community’s demands. Instead, on 7 February Iranian President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran would begin enriching uranium to 20 percent. According to Iran, it began producing highly enriched uranium on 9 February. Federal Foreign Minister Westerwelle criticized Tehran’s refusal to cooperate and announced that the international community would consider “further measures” if Iranian leaders continued on their current path.
On 18 February the IAEA presented a new report on Iran’s nuclear programme. Westerwelle stated that the report again confirmed Iran’s failure to address all of the unanswered questions about its nuclear programme. Iran had the right to use nuclear energy for civilian purposes, but it also had to fulfil its obligations. The Federal Foreign Minister reaffirmed that a nuclear armed Iran would pose a considerable threat to the region and to the stability of the entire world. Talks had therefore begun at the United Nations as well as between Germany and its European partners on what could be done to prevent this.
What are the demands of the international community?
The uranium enrichment is problematic because it could also be used to produce the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons.
Iran has ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby committing itself to renouncing nuclear weapons and to allowing the IAEA to inspect its entire stock of fissile material, which could also be used in the construction of atomic weapons. The inspections are performed as part of the Safeguards Agreement which the country signed with the IAEA and which came into effect in 1974.
The official Iranian line is that its nuclear programme serves to supplement the country’s energy supply with nuclear power. The foundation for this was laid as early as the late 1950s. There are currently no nuclear power stations in the network – there are only research reactors. Iran’s first nuclear power station designed for the production of energy is currently being constructed in Bushehr with Russian help. Russia has also guaranteed the nuclear fuel for this power station. This obviates the need for Iran to carry out its own uranium enrichment in order to produce fuel rods. Official Iranian sources nevertheless maintain that Iran intends to use the technology only for peaceful purposes and not to produce nuclear weapons.
In 2002, however, it emerged that, as part of its nuclear programme, Iran had, over a period of 18 years, been building plants and acquiring and using materials which it was required to declare under the terms of the Safeguards Agreement. By so doing, Iran grossly violated its international obligations. To this day Iran has been unable to dispel the resulting major doubts and questions about the nature of its nuclear programme.
What does the Non-Proliferation Treaty say? Every country has the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes – military use is the sole preserve of the five nuclear powers. The IAEA monitors the nuclear programmes of these countries so that all parties can be sure that the conditions are observed. Since it came to light that Iran had been pursuing a clandestine nuclear programme for 18 years, the IAEA has been attempting to clarify the questions and doubts arising from this discovery as part of its monitoring responsibilities. However, for several years Iran has been refusing to comply with the IAEA’s demands for cooperation and transparency.
Alongside the IAEA’s efforts, the German, French and British foreign ministers (the E3) embarked on a negotiation process with Iran and called upon it to cease its uranium enrichment activities until confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme had been restored. Iran is still refusing to comply with this demand.
As neither its own efforts nor those of the E3 achieved any significant progress, the IAEA submitted the case to the United Nations Security Council in February 2006. At the same time, the IAEA issued a resolution calling upon Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities pending the restoration of lost confidence. The resolution also called upon Iran to reconsider the construction of a heavy-water reactor and to ratify and implement the Supplementary Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement which provides for enhanced inspections.
Decisions of the United Nations Security Council
The UN Security Council took action, initially in the form of a declaration by the President in March 2006, and subsequently by formulating five resolutions (August 2006, No. 1696; December 2006, No. 1737; March 2007, No. 1747; March 2008, No. 1803; and September 2008, No. 1835). These resolutions address the IAEA’s demands, particularly the calls to suspend enrichment, reprocessing and activities involving heavy water, and to implement the Supplementary Protocols and make them binding in international law. The Security Council also decided to impose internationally binding sanctions:
The aim is to persuade Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA and to restore the confidence of the international community. The Security Council therefore bans the supply of any goods and technologies which contribute to the controversial nuclear programme. Accounts held abroad by individuals or entities involved in the programme shall be frozen. Transfer of know-how shall also be prohibited. Additional measures included a ban on all weapons exports from Iran, a call for vigilance in connection with weapons sales to Iran as well as a call to grant no more state loans to the Iranian Government (except for humanitarian and development purposes). The EU also agreed not to supply any weapons to Iran.
Negotiation offers from the international community
Even after handing the case over to the UN Security Council, the E3 continued its efforts. The format was expanded (E3/EU+3), and in June 2006 the German, French and British foreign ministers, together with the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, and their counterparts from the United States, Russia and China, offered Iran a comprehensive cooperation package.
The package, which included the prospect of extensive economic, political and nuclear cooperation in return for compliance with the Security Council’s demands was to form the basis for negotiations. Iran responded formally to this offer, but continued to reject its key demand – compliance with the Security Council resolutions.
On 14 June 2008, Solana again travelled to Tehran, this time accompanied by the Political Directors of the E3, Russia and China, to present a new offer of negotiations. In many respects, the new proposals express the 2006 offer in more concrete terms, but they do include new elements, particularly in the economic and political spheres.
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Twin-track approach
The strategy adopted by Germany, together with its international partners, can be characterized as a twin-track approach:
• First, talks with the Iranian leadership are being used to assess whether Iran is prepared to return to the negotiating table, subject to its compliance with the calls to suspend enrichment.
• Second, the United Nations Security Council is focusing on the dossier to ensure that Iran complies with the demands that are binding under international law.
Following the most recent Security Council resolution, therefore, the E3/EU+3 foreign ministers issued a statement reaffirming their willingness to negotiate with Iran. At the same time they expressed the hope that Iran would take this signal seriously and choose the road to negotiations.
Last updated 19.02.2010