The conflict surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme

Major doubts and questions about the nature of its nuclear programme have dogged Iran since 2002. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Security Council and the E3+3 countries have repeatedly called on Iran to be transparent and cooperate. Foreign Minister Westerwelle is calling for a political solution in the dispute surrounding the nuclear programme.

The IAEA report on Iran
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The IAEA report on Iran

On 8 November 2011, the IAEA stated in a report to the organization’s Board of Governors and to the UN Security Council that Iran was pushing ahead with its uranium enrichment activities despite all calls from the international community. The IAEA’s evidence of a possible military dimension of the nuclear programme has caused particular concern.

An IAEA mission to Iran from 20 to 21 January 2012 was not successful. The inspectors were not granted access to the nuclear plant in Parchin and left the country without having achieved anything. Foreign Minister Westerwelle stated in Berlin on 22 February: “Denying access to nuclear installations is another Iranian affront against the IAEA and the international community.” He went on to say that this showed that the recent decision by the EU to adopt tougher sanctions against the country – including an embargo on Iranian oil imports into the EU – was right.

In a later report published on 24 February 2012, the IAEA expressed its continued great concern about the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

For years there has been reason to doubt that Iran’s nuclear programme serves exclusively peaceful purposes. Iran is failing to cooperate adequately with the IAEA on this issue, and so Germany is working with the United States, Russia, China, France and the UK to find a diplomatic solution to the nuclear conflict. These countries – also known as E3+3 – have repeatedly extended offers of negotiations to Iran. The UN Security Council has also repeatedly urged Iran to cooperate and heed the call for transparency.

E3+3 talks with Iran

Ashton and Dschalili in Istanbul
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Ashton and Dschalili in Istanbul

In talks with the E3+3 (Germany, France, Britain, China, Russia and the US, as well as the EU High Representative), Iran is to restore the international community’s confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Following a lengthy break, the talks were resumed in Istanbul on 14 April 2012. The aim was to persuade Iran to clarify all outstanding issues surrounding its nuclear programme. After the meeting with Iran’s chief negotiator Saeed Jalili, the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton said that the talks had been constructive. They are to be continued in Baghdad on 23 May.

Foreign Minister Westerwelle is calling for a political solution to the dispute about Iran’s nuclear programme and warned against a regional arms race which would be triggered by a nuclear-armed Iran.

Together with its international partners within the E3+3, Germany is pursuing a dual approach. On the one hand, it offers Iran comprehensive cooperation should it choose to cooperate with the international community on its nuclear programme. On the other hand, should Iran not cooperate, UN Security Council sanctions are aimed at persuading it to yield to the demands of the international community.

UN sanctions

The United Nations has imposed sanctions on Iran as a result of the nuclear dispute – most recently on 9 June 2010 with Security Council Resolution 1929. At the time, Federal Minister Westerwelle called the resolution a clear signal from the international community that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran would not be accepted. At the same time he stressed that the goal remained to resolve the conflict by diplomatic means.

Resolution 1929 (2010) toughened sanctions against Iran that have been in place since the end of 2006. The resolution contains balanced measures aimed at persuading the Iranian leadership to review its position. The sanctions relate to restrictions in trade with Iran, the insurance and financial sector, transport sector, investments in the oil and gas industry as well as new visa bans and the freezing of accounts held by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. However, the resolution contains no measures directed at the Iranian civilian population.

EU involvement

Heavy water production plant at Arak, Iran
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Heavy water production plant at Arak, Iran

The European Union implemented the UN sanctions against Iran and extended them in further rounds of sanctions – most recently at the Foreign Affairs Council on 23 January 2012. There the EU Foreign Ministers adopted tough new sanctions aimed at the Iranian nuclear programme’s sources of funding: an embargo on Iranian oil imports into the EU and financial sanctions against the Iranian central bank. These measures were targeted at “the heart of Iran’s nuclear programme”, stated Foreign Minister Westerwelle with some conviction.

Foreign Affairs Council adopts tougher sanctions against Iran, 23 January 2012

Before that, the EU had adopted a much stricter control and monitoring system for banks and financial transactions with Iran, a ban on medium and long-term export credits, comprehensive listings of Iranian companies, institutions, individuals and dual-use goods, sanctions in the energy sector not related to proliferation, as well as obligations to carry out tougher controls on shipping and a landing ban for Iranian cargo planes at European airports.

Iranian enrichment plant at Qom

However, the dispute with Iran about its nuclear programme began long before that. On 21 September 2009 Iran informed the IAEA about the existence of a uranium enrichment facility near the town of Qom that it had hitherto kept secret, in contravention of its IAEA obligations. After 15 months, the E3+3 managed once again to conduct direct talks with Iran on 1 October 2009. During the meeting in Geneva, Iran declared its readiness to grant the IAEA access to the enrichment facility.

On 27 November 2009 the IAEA Board of Governors called on Iran to stop building work at the enrichment plant in Qom immediately, to cooperate with the international community and to make its nuclear programme transparent. Instead of heeding the call, Iran announced the construction of more facilities and on 9 February 2010 began enriching uranium to 20 percent.

The question of fuel supplies for the Tehran Research Reactor

IAEA in Vienna
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IAEA in Vienna

In June 2009 Iran approached the IAEA asking for help with the supply of fuel rods (enriched to 20 percent) for a medical research reactor in Tehran. The IAEA suggested Iran send 1200 kg of home-produced low-level enriched uranium abroad so that, following further enrichment in Russia and production of the fuel rods in France, the first delivery could be made one year later.

During technical discussions in Vienna in October 2009, the IAEA put forward concrete proposals for such a procedure. The Federal Government welcomed these suggestions, hoping that the first confidence-building steps could follow.

On 24 May 2010 Iran informed the IAEA of a trilateral declaration drawn up on 17 May with Turkey and Brazil, in which Iran declared its readiness to send 1200 kg of its own uranium enriched to 3.5 percent to Turkey, in return for fuel rods to be delivered within a year. However, many questions remained unanswered. For example, Iran wanted to continue enriching uranium to 20 percent and was not prepared to talk about its nuclear programme.

Why is uranium enrichment in Iran problematic?

Uranium enrichment is problematic because it can be used to provide not only the fuel necessary for nuclear power stations but also the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons.

Iran has ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which includes a commitment by all non-nuclear states not to develop nuclear weapons. At the same time they have the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In order that all partners can be sure that a nuclear programme presented as being for peaceful purposes is not used to develop weapons, the IAEA monitors all nuclear fissile material in the country. The inspections are performed as part of the so-called Safeguards Agreement, which came into effect for Iran in 1974.

Nuclear plant in Natanz, Iran © dpa/picture-alliance

Nuclear plant in Natanz, Iran

The official Iranian line is that its nuclear programme serves to supplement the country’s energy supply with nuclear power. However, there are currently no nuclear power stations in the energy grid – only research reactors. Iran’s first nuclear power station is currently being constructed in Bushehr with Russian help. Russia guarantees to supply the fuel rods for this power station, meaning Iran does not need to carry out its own uranium enrichment in order to produce fuel rods.

Official Iranian sources maintain that they intend to use nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes and not to produce nuclear weapons. In 2002, however, it emerged that Iran had, over a period of 18 years, been building plants and using materials which it was required to declare under the terms of the Safeguards Agreement. In so doing, Iran grossly violated its international obligations. Since then the IAEA has been trying to resolve the issues and doubts concerning Iran’s nuclear programme. Amongst other things, the IAEA issued a resolution in 2006 calling upon Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities pending the restoration of lost confidence. The resolution also called upon Iran to reconsider the construction of a heavy-water reactor and to ratify and implement the Supplementary Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, which provides for stricter controls.

Decisions by the United Nations Security Council

UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1929 © picture-alliance/dpa

UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1929

As neither its own efforts nor those of the E3 achieved any substantial progress, the IAEA submitted the case to the United Nations Security Council in February 2006. The UN Security Council took action, initially in the form of a statement by the President in March 2006, and subsequently by formulating six resolutions (August 2006, No. 1696; December 2006, No. 1737; March 2007, No. 1747; March 2008, No. 1803; September 2008, No. 1835; June 2010, No. 1929). These resolutions address the IAEA’s demands (particularly the calls to suspend enrichment, reprocessing and activities involving heavy water, and to implement the Supplementary Protocol) and make them binding under international law. The Security Council has also decided on several occasions to impose internationally binding sanctions.

The Security Council has banned the supply of goods and technologies which could contribute to Iran’s controversial nuclear programme. An extensive arms embargo has been imposed on Iran and bank accounts held abroad by individuals or entities involved in this programme frozen. There are also travel bans in place for certain individuals who are involved in the Iranian nuclear programme. Specific measures are aimed particularly at members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who are closely involved in the nuclear programme. In addition, there is a ban on all weapons exports from Iran, the right to inspect suspect vessels on the high seas, restrictions on Iran’s financial sector and a call to grant the Iranian Government no more state credits (except for humanitarian and development purposes).

Last updated 15.04.2012

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